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The Economics of Orphan Drugs: The Effectiveness of Priority Review
Vouchers on the Development of Drugs to Combat Neglected Tropical
Diseases
Abstract
Neglected tropical diseases (NTDs) such as malaria and cholera affect more than 1.4 billion people a year.
Pharmaceutical companies have historically neglected these diseases, as the affected populations are also some
of the world’s poorest. In 2007, a bill was signed into US law that created a Priority Review Voucher (PRV)
program. This program grants developers of drugs for neglected diseases a waiver that reduces the time
needed for FDA drug approval. This waiver can be sold to other pharmaceutical companies hoping to expedite
the process for potential blockbuster drugs. This law is still in its early stages at the time of this paper, and it
would not be feasible for any drugs to be fully approved due to the long drug development timeline. By
analyzing FDA clinical trial data, though, initial trends can be analyzed for the development of drugs for
NTDs. The clinical trial data does not fully support the effectiveness of the PRV program, but recent sales
prices support that the market incentives are working correctly.
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ABSTRACT 
Neglected tropical diseases (NTDs) such as malaria and cholera affect more than 1.4 billion 
people a year. Pharmaceutical companies have historically neglected these diseases, as the 
affected populations are also some of the world’s poorest. In 2007, a bill was signed into US law 
that created a Priority Review Voucher (PRV) program. This program grants developers of drugs 
for neglected diseases a waiver that reduces the time needed for FDA drug approval. This waiver 
can be sold to other pharmaceutical companies hoping to expedite the process for potential 
blockbuster drugs. This law is still in its early stages at the time of this paper, and it would not be 
feasible for any drugs to be fully approved due to the long drug development timeline. By 
analyzing FDA clinical trial data, though, initial trends can be analyzed for the development of 
drugs for NTDs. The clinical trial data does not fully support the effectiveness of the PRV 














The purpose of this paper is to analyze the effectiveness of the Priority Review Voucher program 
on the development of drugs to combat neglected tropical diseases. 
Motivation 
I have been personally motivated by this topic after analyzing the orphan drug landscape. My 
initial literature review made it very clear that many researchers had analyzed the proliferation of 
orphan drugs in the US since 1984 for classic rare diseases such as cystic fibrosis. Far less 
thought and research, though, focused on the subgroup of paradoxically named ‘rare diseases’ 
that kills millions every year. This paradox of some of the world’s most common diseases being 
labeled a ‘rare disease’ in the US was what I found initially so intriguing. Looking further into 
these diseases, I found the Priority Review Voucher program, which I found to be a fascinating 
program developed to incentivize the private sector to create ‘profitless’ drugs by utilizing the 
bureaucracy and inefficiency of the US Food and Drug Association.  
Methods 
This paper analyzes data from ClinicalTrials.gov: an online registry supported by the U.S. 
National Institutes of Health. The data was analyzed using tools from Microsoft Excel. All cases 
of clinical trials applying to multiple diseases were discounted. Trial dates are based on the trial 
start dates as reported to ClinicalTrials.gov.  
Findings 
There has been an increase in the percentage growth of clinical trials for the NTDs observed in 
the years since the passage of the PRV program in 2007.  
The market price of the vouchers has exceeded expectations and will likely continue to rise.  
BACKGROUND Drugs	  and	  devices	  to	  treat	  rare	  diseases	  are	  increasingly	  common	  in	  today’s	  national	  and	  international	  health	  care	  landscape,	  but	  this	  was	  not	  always	  the	  case.	  New	  laws	  and	  regulations	  have	  altered	  the	  natural	  markets	  and	  created	  economic	  incentives	  to	  encourage	  the	  development	  and	  sale	  of	  drugs	  and	  medical	  devices	  for	  diseases	  that	  individually	  affect	  less	  than	  1	  in	  1250	  individuals	  in	  the	  United	  States	  (Orphan	  Drug	  Act,	  Pub.	  L.	  no	  97-­‐414,	  96	  Stat.	  2049	  (1984	  as	  Amended).	  Rare	  diseases	  are	  called	  “orphan	  diseases”	  and	  the	  drugs	  that	  treat	  these	  orphan	  diseases	  are	  called	  “orphan	  drugs.”	  The	  term	  ‘orphan’	  is	  a	  reference	  to	  the	  “pharmacological	  neglect”	  these	  diseases	  suffered	  in	  the	  early	  to	  mid	  twentieth	  century	  (Institute	  of	  Medicine	  (IOM)	  2009).	  Diseases	  with	  a	  population	  prevalence	  of	  less	  than	  200,000	  people	  are	  labeled	  “rare”	  or	  “orphans”	  in	  the	  United	  States,	  but	  this	  cut	  off	  varies	  by	  country	  (Orphan	  Drug	  Act,	  Pub.	  L.	  no	  97-­‐414,	  96	  Stat.	  2049	  (1984	  as	  Amended).	  According	  to	  this	  definition,	  “it	  is	  estimated	  that	  over	  7,000	  rare	  diseases	  affect	  an	  estimated	  25-­‐30	  million	  people	  […]	  in	  the	  U.S.”	  constituting	  8-­‐12%	  of	  the	  US	  population	  (Griggs	  et	  al.	  2009,	  20-­‐26).	  Advances	  in	  pathophysiology	  are	  leading	  to	  more	  strictly	  defined	  diseases,	  leading	  to	  the	  identification	  of	  about	  250	  new	  orphan	  diseases	  each	  year	  (Hernberg-­‐Ståhl	  and	  Reljanović	  2013).	  Lacking	  constraints,	  the	  health	  care	  industry	  would	  work	  to	  cure	  all	  rare	  diseases,	  but	  money	  and	  time	  impose	  large	  hurdles	  in	  the	  development	  of	  every	  drug—be	  it	  for	  a	  rare	  disease	  or	  not.	  New	  drugs	  are	  estimated	  to	  cost	  between	  $800	  million	  and	  $1.3	  billion	  dollars	  and	  take	  between	  10	  and	  15	  years	  to	  develop	  (IOM	  2009).	  Drugs	  to	  treat	  rare	  diseases	  are	  often	  just	  as	  expensive	  and	  take	  just	  as	  much	  time	  as	  possible	  ‘blockbuster	  drugs’	  that	  affect	  a	  large	  swath	  of	  the	  population,	  rendering	  
this	  system	  of	  treating	  the	  “far	  less	  commercially	  attractive”	  orphan	  drugs	  “simply	  infeasible”	  (IOM	  2009).	  With	  increased	  public	  awareness	  and	  a	  new	  law,	  there	  was	  a	  significant	  shift	  in	  the	  economic	  incentives	  to	  encourage	  pharmaceutical	  companies	  to	  develop	  orphan	  drugs.	  	  Late	  in	  the	  1970s,	  “several	  American	  rare	  disease	  organizations	  united	  to	  address	  the	  need	  for	  medical	  research	  and	  translation	  of	  that	  research	  into	  drugs	  and	  therapies	  for	  their	  members”	  (Largent	  and	  Pearson	  2012,	  27-­‐34).	  Abbey	  Meyers,	  then-­‐president	  of	  the	  National	  Organization	  for	  Rare	  Diseases,	  “embarked	  on	  a	  public	  relations	  campaign,	  bringing	  television	  cameras	  and	  newspaper	  reporters	  into	  the	  laboratories	  where	  recovered	  patients	  helped	  to	  fill	  capsules	  with	  lifesaving	  medicines	  that	  drug	  companies	  refused	  to	  manufacture”	  (Largent	  and	  Pearson	  2012,	  27-­‐34).	  Increasing	  pressure	  from	  the	  general	  public	  and	  patient	  advocacy	  groups	  pushed	  the	  US	  government	  to	  pass	  the	  Orphan	  Drug	  Act	  (Largent	  and	  Pearson	  2012,	  27-­‐34).	  Passed	  in	  1983,	  the	  law	  affirms	  that	  “there	  is	  reason	  to	  believe	  that	  some	  promising	  orphan	  drugs	  will	  not	  be	  developed	  unless	  changes	  are	  made	  […]	  to	  reduce	  the	  costs	  of	  developing	  such	  drugs”	  and	  that	  “it	  is	  in	  the	  public	  interest	  to	  provide	  […]	  incentives	  for	  the	  development	  of	  orphan	  drugs”	  (Orphan	  Drug	  Act,	  Pub.	  L.	  no	  97-­‐414,	  96	  Stat.	  2049	  (1984	  as	  Amended).	  These	  economic	  incentives	  include	  “grants,	  tax	  credits,	  a	  waiver	  of	  the	  $1	  million	  Prescription	  Drug	  User	  Fee	  Act	  filing	  fee,	  FDA	  assistance	  with	  protocol	  development,	  priority	  review	  of	  new	  drug	  applications	  (a	  6-­‐month	  review	  rather	  than	  the	  standard	  10-­‐month	  review),	  and	  [most	  importantly]	  a	  7-­‐year	  U.S.	  market	  exclusivity	  following	  approval	  of	  a	  designated	  orphan	  product”	  (IOM	  2009).	  In	  the	  decade	  preceding	  the	  passage	  of	  the	  Orphan	  Drug	  Act,	  “only	  ten	  new	  drugs	  for	  rare	  diseases	  were	  developed,”	  while	  “more	  than	  1,100	  new	  orphan	  treatments	  have	  entered	  
the	  research	  pipeline”	  since	  the	  law	  passed	  in	  1983	  (Largent	  and	  Pearson	  2012,	  27-­‐34).	  Today,	  orphan	  drugs	  make	  up	  about	  one	  third	  “of	  all	  newly	  approved	  drugs	  and	  biologics”	  (Largent	  and	  Pearson	  2012,	  27-­‐34).	  The	  FDA	  estimates	  that	  roughly	  12	  million	  people	  who	  suffer	  from	  orphan	  diseases	  have	  benefited	  from	  the	  Orphan	  Drug	  Act	  (IOM	  (Institute	  of	  Medicine)	  2009).	  Analysis	  of	  the	  effects	  of	  the	  Orphan	  Drug	  Act	  have	  pointed	  to	  positive	  achievements	  of	  many	  of	  the	  bill’s	  initial	  goals,	  but	  raise	  concerns	  for	  the	  future	  viability	  and	  efficacy	  of	  the	  funding	  mechanisms.	  	  Many	  initial	  concerns	  about	  the	  Orphan	  Drug	  Act	  have	  been	  found	  to	  be	  nonissues.	  Despite	  initial	  concerns	  that	  drug	  developers	  would	  focus	  on	  the	  more	  common	  rare	  diseases	  and	  ignore	  the	  truly	  rare	  ones,	  an	  in	  depth	  study	  by	  the	  US	  Department	  of	  Health	  and	  Human	  Services	  found	  that	  “in	  no	  year	  was	  the	  average	  patient	  population	  for	  designated	  products	  more	  than	  90,000,	  whereas	  in	  general	  the	  prevalence	  for	  designated	  products	  was	  between	  50,000	  and	  70,000”	  (Haffner,	  Torrent-­‐Farnell,	  and	  Maher	  2008,	  2041-­‐2044).	  Additionally,	  the	  technological	  advances	  introduced	  by	  fighting	  rare	  diseases	  have	  dissuaded	  those	  who	  question	  the	  larger	  impact	  of	  the	  legislation,	  as	  “development	  of	  orphan	  products	  has	  been	  and	  is	  part	  of	  the	  discovery	  of	  innovative	  treatments”	  such	  as	  “RNA	  interference,	  antisense	  therapies,	  new	  gene	  therapy,	  and	  others”	  (Haffner,	  Torrent-­‐Farnell,	  and	  Maher	  2008,	  2041-­‐2044).	  	  It	  has	  become	  increasingly	  more	  difficult	  to	  determine	  population	  sizes	  in	  recent	  years	  than	  in	  the	  bill’s	  conception	  in	  1983.	  The	  development	  of	  targeted	  therapies	  and	  personalized	  medicine	  has	  increased	  the	  number	  of	  subpopulations	  (Hernberg-­‐Ståhl	  and	  Reljanović	  2013).	  Additionally,	  the	  practice	  of	  “salami	  slicing”	  occurs	  when	  companies	  apply	  for	  orphan	  drug	  designation	  by	  taking	  a	  disease	  with	  a	  prevalence	  greater	  than	  
200,000	  people,	  and	  narrow	  it	  into	  a	  subpopulation	  of	  that	  group	  that’s	  less	  than	  200,000	  people	  in	  order	  to	  reap	  the	  rewards	  of	  the	  orphan	  drug	  label.	  While	  this	  practice	  is	  acceptable	  “when	  a	  disease	  subset	  is	  clearly	  demarcated,	  has	  its	  own	  specific	  pharmacological	  mechanism,	  and	  the	  proposed	  orphan	  drug	  has	  no	  effect	  in	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  population,”	  it	  is	  not	  acceptable	  when	  “the	  proposed	  orphan	  product	  might	  also	  have	  value	  in	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  condition”	  (Hernberg-­‐Ståhl	  and	  Reljanović	  2013).	  The	  extremely	  high	  costs	  of	  some	  orphan	  drugs	  have	  been	  constantly	  dismissed	  by	  the	  National	  Organization	  for	  Rare	  Diseases	  as	  “a	  small	  overall	  expense	  to	  a	  health	  insurance	  company,”	  but	  as	  the	  number	  of	  subpopulations	  grow,	  health	  insurance	  companies	  will	  find	  themselves	  footing	  more	  and	  more	  expensive	  drug	  treatments	  (Largent	  and	  Pearson	  2012,	  27-­‐34).	  “One	  unexpected	  consequence	  of	  orphan	  legislation”	  has	  been	  the	  incentives	  it	  created	  for	  the	  US	  to	  combat	  very	  common	  diseases	  abroad	  (Haffner	  et	  al.,	  2008).	  Diseases	  such	  as	  tuberculosis	  and	  malaria,	  “two	  of	  the	  top	  five	  infectious	  disease	  killers	  in	  the	  world,”	  are	  called	  “neglected	  tropical	  diseases”	  and	  are	  very	  rare	  in	  the	  US	  despite	  their	  prevalence	  in	  other,	  mostly	  developing,	  nations	  (Haffner	  et	  al.,	  2008).	  More	  specifically,	  neglected	  tropical	  diseases	  (NTDs)	  are	  a	  subset	  of	  infectious	  diseases	  that	  share	  two	  main	  characteristics.	  First,	  NTDs	  are	  mostly	  found	  in	  the	  tropics,	  “but	  their	  predilection	  for	  hot	  places	  results	  principally	  from	  the	  fact	  that	  poverty	  is	  found	  in	  greatest	  concentration	  in	  the	  remote	  rural	  communities,	  urban	  slums	  and	  displaced	  populations	  near	  to	  the	  equator”	  (Feasey	  et	  al.	  2010,	  179-­‐200).	  Although	  the	  diseases	  are	  designated	  as	  tropical,	  in	  reality	  “all	  low-­‐income	  countries	  are	  affected	  by	  at	  least	  five	  NTDs	  simultaneous”	  which	  are	  “at	  least	  in	  part	  attributable	  to	  inadequate	  access	  to	  safe	  water,	  sanitation	  and	  appropriate	  housing”	  (Feasey	  et	  al.	  2010,	  179-­‐200).	  The	  second	  main	  characteristic	  of	  NTDs	  is	  that	  by	  
and	  large	  they	  have	  “been	  neglected	  by	  funders,	  researchers	  and	  policy-­‐makers”	  (Feasey	  et	  al.	  2010,	  179-­‐200).	  The	  rarity	  of	  these	  diseases	  in	  the	  US	  typically	  qualifies	  them	  for	  Orphan	  Drug	  designation	  and	  attached	  benefits,	  another	  factor	  encouraging	  pharmaceutical	  companies	  to	  develop	  drugs	  and	  medical	  treatments	  for	  these	  NTDs.	  	  It	  cannot	  be	  overlooked,	  though,	  that	  “little	  is	  invested	  in	  developing	  treatments”	  for	  NTDs	  because	  “most	  of	  the	  people	  suffering	  from	  these	  diseases	  are	  poor”	  (Ridley,	  Grabowski,	  and	  Moe	  2006,	  313-­‐324).	  Three	  researchers	  from	  the	  Fuqua	  School	  of	  Business,	  Duke	  University	  published	  a	  research	  paper	  outlining	  a	  proposal	  to	  incentivize	  drug	  development	  for	  NTDs	  in	  2006.	  The	  researchers	  proposed	  a	  “priority-­‐review	  voucher”	  (PRV)	  program	  (Ridley,	  Grabowski,	  and	  Moe	  2006,	  313-­‐324).	  Under	  this	  program,	  drug	  companies	  that	  developed	  treatments	  for	  NTDs	  would	  receive	  a	  “transferable	  voucher”	  which	  “would	  entitle	  the	  bearer	  to	  priority	  FDA	  review	  for	  another	  drug	  and	  orphan	  drug	  tax	  credits”	  (Ridley,	  Grabowski,	  and	  Moe	  2006,	  313-­‐324).	  This	  voucher	  could	  be	  sold	  to	  a	  pharmaceutical	  company	  pursuing	  FDA	  approval	  for	  a	  potential	  blockbuster	  drug.	  The	  authors	  estimated	  that	  cutting	  the	  FDA	  approval	  time	  in	  almost	  half	  (from	  a	  typical	  10-­‐12	  month	  timeline	  down	  to	  a	  promised	  (but	  not	  mandated)	  six	  months)	  “would	  be	  worth	  more	  than	  $300	  million”	  (Ridley,	  Grabowski,	  and	  Moe	  2006,	  313-­‐324).	  A	  year	  later,	  the	  academic	  proposal	  became	  US	  law,	  as	  it	  was	  included	  in	  the	  Food	  and	  Drug	  Administration	  Amendments	  Act	  of	  2007,	  or	  “FDAAA”.	  	  Although	  the	  law	  is	  not	  the	  exact	  proposal	  of	  the	  three	  authors,	  the	  general	  model	  is	  clearly	  based	  on	  their	  work.	  Section	  1102	  of	  the	  FDAAA	  defines	  a	  ‘priority	  review’	  as	  “review	  and	  action”	  by	  the	  FDA	  “not	  later	  than	  6	  months	  after	  receipt”	  (US	  Food	  and	  Drug	  Administration	  2007,	  150).	  The	  law	  lists	  16	  tropical	  diseases,	  but	  also	  allows	  for	  the	  addition	  of	  “any	  other	  infectious	  disease	  for	  which	  there	  is	  no	  














The following data are from ClinicalTrials.gov: an online registry supported by the U.S. National 
Institutes of Health. Dates from trials are based on the trials’ start date. The data focuses on the 
initial 16 diseases listed in the 2007 law, as enough time has not elapsed to add the two new 
additions from Congress and the FDA since.  
No data was available for the diseases Dracunculiasis	  or	  Fascioliasis	  as	  there	  has	  yet	  to	  be	  clinical	  trials	  targeting	  the	  two	  diseases.	  
Clinical Trial Results 
In order to investigate the possible effect of the PRV program on the development of drugs 
treating neglected tropical diseases, the long-term data on clinical trial start dates need to be 
analyzed. Figure 1 clearly shows a general increase in the number of these clinical trials started. 
The 4-6 years following 2007 should be treated with caution as any drugs for which clinical trial 
data was submitted in that time period likely were already in the drug pipeline before the FDA 









































FDA	  Neglected	  Tropical	  Diseases	  
FDA	  Neglected	  Tropical	  
Figure 2 shows the differing number of clinical trials started for some of the neglected tropical 
diseases for which there were generally higher levels of total clinical trial submissions. 
Figure 2. Number of US Clinical Trials sorted by start date for some select diseases. 
 
Figure 3 illustrates the general decrease in percentage change from year to year between 2001 
and 2014 for the number of clinical trial start dates cataloged for neglected tropical diseases. 
Figure 3: Percent change in number of US Clinical Trials started in that year compared to 


















Neglected	  Tropical	  Disease	  Clinical	  Trials	  
2000-­‐2014	  
Cholera	  Dengue	  Schistosomiasis	  Yaws	  
While the data point towards a generally positive percentage change, the number of trials are 
clearly increasing decreasingly, which is especially pronounced in 2011 and 2013 when there are 
negative percentage changes. Due to the length of the drug development pipeline, these are years 
one would expect to see a large increase if the implementation of the PRV program did in fact 
spur the development of more drugs to combat neglected tropical diseases. When looking at the 
percentage change between 2007 and each subsequent year in reference to 2007 in Figure 4, the 
data are still inconclusive. The percentage difference between 2007 and 2014 is 16.8%, which 
appears noteworthy, but 2013’s percentage difference between 2007 is -1.7% and the largest 
spike occurred in 2010 with an almost 35% percentage difference. The 2010 data were too early 
to be affected by the PRV program, and the negative change in 2013 also corroborates doubts 
about a causative link between the PRV program and increased neglected tropical disease drug 
development. 
Figure 4: Percent change from 2007’s count in number of US Clinical Trials sorted by 


















Percent	  Change	  from	  2007's	  Total	  
While the clinical trial data are inconclusive regarding any effect from the implementation of the 
PRV program, there are other indicators of success. Table 1 details sales of a FDA Priority 
Review Voucher. It is important to note that the FDA offers Priority Review Vouchers not only 
for the pharmaceutical companies that develop drugs to treat neglected tropical diseases but also 
for those who create drugs targeting rare pediatric diseases. While the diseases differ, the priority 
review vouchers received in each instance are virtually identical. The increasing prices in Table 
1 point to a marketplace that values these vouchers at continuously higher prices. 
Table 1. Voucher sale prices since the program’s inception. 
Date Purchase Price 
July 2014* $67.5 million 
November 2014 $125 million 
May 2015* $245 million 
August 2015* $350 million 
*These vouchers were awarded for rare pediatric diseases and not neglected tropical 
diseases.  


















This increase in market prices for vouchers is easily seen in Figure 5. 
Figure 5. Voucher sale prices since the program’s inception. 
 
Markers in red represent vouchers that were awarded for rare pediatric diseases and not 
neglected tropical diseases.  
































Date	  of	  Sale	  
Voucher	  Sale	  Price	  
FINDINGS 
Effects of Priority Review Voucher program on Clinical Trial Commencement 
The implementation of the 2007 PRV program coincided with a general increase in the number 
of clinical trials started over the following 7 years for drugs that would treat neglected tropical 
diseases. The annual percentage change decreased over the following 7 years, but generally 
remained positive, indicating a nominal increase as seen in Figure 3.  The percentage change 
when comparing 2007 and 2014 was 16.86%. It is clear from Figure 4 that there have been 
almost exclusively positive percentage differences since 2007. The data from each year were not 
rich enough to support the use of a difference of means test. There are a couple of issues with the 
current data available, though, which make it difficult to declare causation. First, it’s unclear 
from FDA clinical trial start data when the researchers began the first steps of the process of 
developing a drug. Due to this and the variance in the drug development timeline, it’s unclear 
whether drug manufacturers with clinical trials in 2014 began the process before the PRV 
program became law in 2007. Second, the data do not give information as to whether those 
beginning clinical trials were aware or incentivized by the PRV program. Third, cross correlation 
is an obvious issue with the data, as the number of trials in a certain year is often contingent on 
trials in the preceding years due to the need for multiple clinical trials in the drug approval 
process. Lastly, control data was unable to be found, as any diseases with the needed similar 
characteristics to those on the list would already be on the list. 
 
Effects of Priority Review Voucher program on Priority Review Voucher Prices 
As can be seen in Figure 5, the sales price for the vouchers has increase greatly since the first 
sale in July 2014. The last sales price of  $350 million is in line with the initial researchers’ 
estimate that a “priority-review voucher would be worth more than $300 million for a potential 







Table 1. Number of US Clinical Trials sorted by start date for the disease: Blinding Trachoma. 





















Table 2. Number of US Clinical Trials sorted by start date for the disease: Buruli Ulcer. 






















Table 3. Number of US Clinical Trials sorted by start date for the disease: Cholera. 






















Table 4. Number of US Clinical Trials sorted by start date for the disease: Dengue. 





















Human African Trypanosomiasis 
Table 5. Number of US Clinical Trials sorted by start date for the disease: Human African 
Trypanosomiasis, 





















Table 6. Number of US Clinical Trials sorted by start date for the disease: Leishmaniasis. 






















Table 7. Number of US Clinical Trials sorted by start date for the disease: Leprosy. 






















Table 8. Number of US Clinical Trials sorted by start date for the disease: Lymphatic filariasis. 






















Table 9. Number of US Clinical Trials sorted by start date for the disease: Malaria. 






















Table 10. Number of US Clinical Trials sorted by start date for the disease: Onchocerciasis. 






















Table 11. Number of US Clinical Trials sorted by start date for the disease: Schistosomiasis. 





















Soil transmitted helminthiasis 
Table 12. Number of US Clinical Trials sorted by start date for the disease: Soil transmitted 
helminthiasis. 





















Table 13. Number of US Clinical Trials sorted by start date for the disease: Tuberculosis. 






















Table 14. Number of US Clinical Trials sorted by start date for the disease: Yaws. 






















Table 15. Number of US Clinical Trials sorted by start date for all preceding diseases. 





















Table 16. Percent change in number of US Clinical Trials sorted by start date for all preceding 
diseases by year. 





















Table 17: Percent change from 2007’s count in number of US Clinical Trials sorted by start date 
for all preceding diseases by year. 





















Table 18. Vouchers awarded since the programs inception. 
 














Table 19. Status of vouchers awarded. 
 














Voucher Sale Price 
Graph 1. Voucher sale prices since the program’s inception with a linear and exponential trend 
line. 
 
*These vouchers were awarded for rare pediatric diseases and not neglected tropical diseases.  































Voucher	  Sale	  Price	  
Series1	  Expon.	  (Series1)	  Linear	  (Series1)	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